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This paper provides an overview of the Reserve Bank of India’s approach to macroprudential 
regulation and systemic risk management, and reviews lessons drawn from the Indian 
experience. It emphasizes the need for harmonization of monetary policy and prudential 
objectives, which may not be possible if banking supervision is separated from central 
banks. It also notes that supervisors need to have the necessary independence and 
flexibility to act in a timely manner on the basis of available information. Macroprudential 
regulation is an inexact science with limitations and needs to be used in conjunction with 
other policies to be effective. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Explicit pursuit of macroeconomic and financial stability can be said to be the single 
most significant lesson from the global financial crisis. The importance of this mandate 
lies in decisively effecting a course correction with regard to the approach and 
philosophy for regulation of the financial system. It is now being acknowledged that a 
macroprudential  perspective is critical for designing and pursuing microprudential 
regulation of institutions and markets. Two distinct but highly interrelated constructs 
have come to epitomize this post-crisis framework: systemic risk management and 
macroprudential  regulation. Both these concepts are philosophically appealing and 
conceptually sound, but operationally quite challenging. Understanding the nuanced 
interplay between these is crucial for designing an efficient operative framework for 
financial stability. 
Systemic Risk Management 
Systemic risk is a broad  construct  with no universally accepted single definition. 
Conceptually, it implies   the probability of sudden disruption to a large part of the 
financial system, reflected in the failure of multiple institutions and freezing of markets, 
triggered by a common shock and propagated through interconnected exposures and 
correlated positions. Any framework for containing systemic risks would need to 
involve the following elements: 
Strengthening the financial system’s resilience to economic downturns and other 
adverse aggregate shocks; 
Sound monitoring of common, correlated exposures among financial institutions 
arising out of network linkages; and developing measures to quantify the contribution 
of individual institutions to systemic risk; and 
Minimizing the moral hazard associated with failure of systemically important 
institutions and finding mechanisms to restrict the contagion impact of failing 
institutions during crisis. 
The role of a macroprudential approach to financial sector policies becomes critical in 
this context. Macroprudential  regulation can be considered one of the tools of this 
larger policy framework. 
2.  ANALYTICS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION  
Macroprudential  regulation, as it has come to be generally interpreted, essentially 
envisages that the key instruments of prudential regulation—capital, liquidity, and 
provisioning—vary dynamically according to macroeconomic circumstances. The 
macroeconomic triggers could arise either from changes in the normal economic cycle 
or sharp asset price movements. Conceptually, this is supposed to be in addition to 
stricter prudential standards for capital, liquidity, and leverage across the board. The 
dynamics of macroprudential regulation are evident when seen in terms of the broad 
objectives: 
To address pro-cyclical elements in the financial system. The basic idea is that 
cushions should be built up in upswings to be relied on when rough times arrive—the 
countercyclical approach. The key measures under consideration, which have 
countercyclical characteristics and could act as automatic stabilizers are the following: 
Building buffers through capital conservation based on simple capital conservation 
rules. The objective is to ensure that banks which have depleted capital buffers rebuild 
them by reducing the discretionary distribution of earnings. A buffer range will be ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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established above the regulatory minimum capital requirement and distribution 
constraints will be imposed on the bank when the capital level falls within this range.  
A countercyclical capital buffer that will sit on top of the conservation buffer established 
as a range to take account of the macro-financial environment in which banks operate. 
The buffer will be triggered only when excessive credit growth, compared with the 
long-term trend, is judged to be associated with the buildup of system-wide risk. To 
make this buffer effective, it has to be combined with jurisdictional reciprocity. The 
upside of this will be that capital will not be a constraint to maintain the flow of credit to 
the economy during a period of stress. 
Promoting forward-looking provisions through a change in accounting standards 
toward an expected loss approach. Current standards do not permit credit losses 
based on events that are expected to occur in the future to be included in provisions. 
To provide a mechanism to correct the inherently skewed pricing of credit risk 
by financial institutions through the cycle. One of the major causes of the recent 
crisis was the general euphoria in the pre-crisis boom period which led to the financial 
sector’s severe under-pricing of the risks. In a risk-based capital regime, this directly 
implied less capital for high-risk activities during booms, hence increased lending to 
high-risk sectors and increased trading volumes in riskier instruments. The extent of 
risk under-pricing only became evident after the crisis had set in. The situation swung 
to the other extreme after the crisis. Macroprudential tools, including the leverage ratio, 
are meant to address situations like this by effectively influencing the costs of credit 
exposures dynamically.   
To attempt pre-empting asset price bubbles in the economy and limit the 
buildup of financial risks in the system. Asset price booms have invariably been 
identified with a pre-crisis economic configuration as both symptomatic as well as 
causative factors. Before the crisis, though, policy frameworks adopted an approach of 
benign neglect of asset prices as they saw little role for monetary or prudential policy 
in addressing these. The recent crisis has forced a rethink in this regard. There is now 
broad consensus on the need to use the credit channel as a macroprudential 
instrument.  
The Basel III Framework announced in December 2010 incorporates some of the 
above elements, particularly in regard to capital requirements. Starting 2016, banks 
will be required to build up, over a 3-year period through 2018, a capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5% as well as a countercyclical buffer ranging from 0% to 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets, depending on the extent of the buildup of system-wide risk. With 
regard to countercyclical capital buffers, a broad framework is laid out based on 
deviation of the credit to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio from its long-term trend. 
Recognizing the different contexts in each jurisdiction, each national supervisor is 
expected to apply judgment in setting the buffer after using the best information 
available to gauge the buildup of system-wide risk. However, the proposed framework 
does not envisage addressing sectoral credit issues through such countercyclical 
measures. 
The challenge, particularly in growing emerging market economies, is to reconcile this 
approach with the risk of credit constraints, since emerging market supply side issues 
are qualitatively very different from those in advanced economies. Generalized credit 
increases, higher than the trend, may not be a matter of systemic concern in view of 
the changing structure of economies. The framework in these countries would 
therefore have to adopt a more nuanced, sectoral focus. There are challenges in trying 
to influence asset prices through the credit channel. First, it is really difficult to set an 
optimum level of asset prices as a target. Second, only bank-financed exposures to 
asset markets can be influenced through macroprudential  tools, which may not 
generally be the dominant funding source. There have been instances where asset ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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price buildup is due to leverage outside the banking sector. Third, the sectoral 
approach will inevitably involve an element of regulatory judgment and discretion.   
In this context, it is pertinent to recount the Indian experience in applying 
macroprudential elements in view of excessive credit to certain sectors, particularly 
commercial real estate, which has been the cause of most banking crises. 
The Indian Experience  
During the expansionary phase since 2004, the Reserve Bank of India took various 
measures to counter pro-cyclical trends. The potential adverse impact of high credit 
growth in some sectors and asset price fluctuations on banks’ balance sheets at 
various points in time were contained through pre-emptive countercyclical provisioning 
and differentiated risk weights for certain sensitive sectors. In October 2004, the rapid 
growth in housing and consumer credit was flagged as a concern. As a temporary 
countercyclical measure, the risk weight applicable to these loans was increased by 
25 percentage points. In the context of continuing high credit growth, the limitations of 
the prudential framework in capturing risks of the pro-cyclical nature of bank credit ex-
ante were recognized in October 2005. This triggered an across-the-board increase in 
provisioning requirements for standard assets.  
To counter the possibility of an asset bubble, in addition to concerns about credit 
quality, the risk weight on banks’ exposure to commercial real estate and the capital 
market was increased from 100% to 125% in July 2005. Given the continued rapid 
expansion in credit to the commercial real estate sector, the risk weight on exposure to 
this sector was increased to 150% in May 2006. Further, the general provisioning 
requirement on standard advances in specific sectors—personal loans, loans and 
advances qualifying as capital market exposures, residential housing loans above 
Rs2,000,000  and commercial real estate loans—was increased from 0.4% to 1.0% in 
May 2006 and further to 2.0% in January 2007 (Table 1).  ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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Table 1: Countercyclical measures for Commercial Real Estate  
Month and 
Year 
CRE Risk Weight (%)   CRE Provisions on 
Standard Assets (%) 
December 2004  100   0.25  
July 2005   125   0.25  
March 2006   125   0.40  
May 2006   150   1.00  
January 2007   150   2.00  
               CRE: Commercial Real Estate  
               Source(s): Reserve Bank of India  
 
The Backdrop of India’s Countercyclical Actions  
While contemplating the measures, the Reserve Bank did not have any disaggregated 
statistical data or evidence to support our concerns regarding the potential risks of 
rising bank exposures to real estate, among other sensitive sectors, based on the 
incurred loss method  (Box 1). However, a clear trend in a significant year-on-year 
increase in aggregate bank credit. The Indian financial system is still largely a bank-
intermediated system, so the bank credit channel becomes a key monetary policy 
transmission instrument. Thus, the aggregate bank credit growth has always formed 
an important variable in the conduct of monetary policy. The credit-deposit ratio, 
particularly on an incremental basis, has been an important indicator.  
In view of the rapid credit expansion during 2003–2006, in addition to the 
countercyclical measures being taken, the Reserve Bank of India indicated in April 
2006 that growth of nonfood bank credit—including investments in bonds, debentures 
and shares of public sector undertakings and private corporate sector and commercial 
paper—would be calibrated to decelerate to around 20% during 2006–2007 from the 
then prevailing growth of above 30%. Inflationary expectations had also started firming 
up, and as part of monetary management the repo rate was increased by 175 basis 
points in stages to 7.75% in March 2007. Simultaneously, the cash reserve ratio (CRR) 
was raised by 200 basis points to 6.50%.  
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Box 1: Addressing Increased Bank Lending to Real Estate 
From a regulatory perspective, the key observable features that tilted the balance in favor of 
some kind of preemptive sectoral action, aimed primarily at preparing the banking sector to 
better manage the potential downsides, were the following: 
 
(i) Onsite inspections of banks started giving indications of the negative fallout of the euphoria 
evident in lax underwriting standards, and a few frauds that came to light. 
 
(ii)  Signs of under-pricing of risks were emerging as real estate prices spiraled, fuelled by 
ample liquidity and the dominant wealth effect transmittal from the stock market boom. Tax 
treatment of capital gains on investments in shares facilitated a tax-efficient transfer of the 
wealth effect to the real estate market.  
 
(iii)  A new factor in the housing credit market that was emerging was the mortgage for 
investment purposes—the trend for second homes, particularly in bigger cities with a rising 
population of young, skilled salaried class. Real estate had crossed the Rubicon to emerge as 
a true investment asset.  
 
(iv) Anecdotal evidence was increasing of the inventory buildups of completed commercial as 
well as residential units. These were clearly signs of real estate having crossed the basic 
demand–supply equation to an investment asset.  
 
(v)  A steep increase in land prices was visible from auction results. Large real estate 
companies could monetize the huge land banks on the back of the then booming stock market 
valuations, with a simultaneous increase in bank lending for commercial real estate.  
 
With this backdrop, the Reserve Bank of India decided to make it costlier for banks to finance 
loans backed by real estate. The rationale of the sectoral, prudential approach was that the 
usual sector-neutral monetary policy instruments could  pose  significant costs to the whole 
economy in the form of increased credit costs. Therefore, while monetary policy instruments 
were used, the objective of this generalized, gradual tightening was quite different from the 
stronger action required in respect of bank exposures to sectors such as real estate.  
 
In the Indian context, the sharp rise in bank credit for real estate was not a clear indicator of an 
asset price bubble, given the inherent demand–supply dynamics in the economy and the 
genuine needs of an economy on a high growth path. A confluence of positive factors 
contributed to the sharp increase in bank lending to real estate, including a decline in inflation 
and stable inflationary expectations, resulting in a decline in both nominal and real interest 
rates and the availability of ample systemic liquidity. Concomitantly, larger companies shifted 
funding to nonbank sources, including external borrowing, which forced banks to look at 
diversifying their lending portfolios. This shift also helped meet the increasing genuine 
demands on commercial real estate, including office space largely accounted for by the IT 
boom, and gradual expansion of organized retail to smaller cities.  
 
The objective of tightening bank credit to real estate, therefore, was not to address the asset 
price bubble per se and not to curtail genuine credit needs of the economy but to prepare the 
banking sector to better manage the potential downsides related to selective sectors. In other 
words the Reserve Bank of India adopted what is now called the “expected” as well as 




Source(s): Reserve Bank of India 
Since the crisis, sectoral provisioning and risk weight requirements have been 
modulated in sync with the emerging conditions. In the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis, the provisioning requirements were brought back to a uniform level of 0.40% in ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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November 2008. However, in view of a large increase in credit to the commercial real 
estate sector and the extent of restructured advances in this sector, the provisions 
required on standard assets in the commercial real estate sector were increased again 
to 1% in November 2009 to build up a cushion against a likely deterioration in asset 
quality. Recently, in December 2010, the risk weights on residential housing loans of 
Rs7.5 million and above were raised to 125%. In addition, a minimum loan-to-value 
ratio of 90% has been prescribed for all mortgage loans above Rs2 million and 80% 
for lesser amounts. In respect of a particular category of housing loans, wherein the 
loans are offered at a ‘teaser’ rate in the first few years, the standard asset 
provisioning requirement was enhanced to 2%. 
Pending finalization of the BCBS guidelines on countercyclical provisioning, in India 
banks were required to achieve an aggregate provisioning level of 70% against non-
performing assets (NPAs) as a macroprudential measure, with a view to augmenting 
provisioning buffer in a counter-cyclical manner when the banks were making good 
profits. The excess of such provisions, made with reference to gross NPAs as on 
September 30, 2010, over the prescribed prudential norms needs to be kept in a 
separate account styled as “countercyclical provisioning buffer”. This buffer will be 
allowed to be used by banks for making specific provisions for NPAs during periods of 
system wide downturn, with the prior approval of RBI.  
What are the key inferences? First, harmonization of monetary policy objectives and 
prudential objectives can give a more complete picture, which may not be possible if 
banking supervision is separate from central banks. Second, macroprudential policy is 
no substitute for monetary tightening; rather, it should act complementary to monetary 
policy. Third, supervisors need to have the necessary independence and flexibility to 
act in a timely manner on the basis of available information, which may be anecdotal, 
circumstantial or incomplete.  
3.  GOING BEYOND MACROPRUDENTIAL 
REGULATION 
As with all ideas that gain currency and wide acceptance in a short period of time, 
macroprudential regulation runs the risk of being over-applied. However, there is an 
equally strong risk of making it too narrow in focus. Macroprudential regulation is just 
one element of a broader macroprudential approach and needs to be supplemented 
with other tools to address systemic risk issues. Such tools could be in the form of 
additional prudential measures applied to all institutions with a systemic objective. 
While it may be difficult to make a binary distinction between microprudential  and 
macroprudential policies—as ultimately all macro risks translate into micro risks for 
financial institutions—it is critical to incorporate a systemic perspective when designing 
policies.  
A recent survey (Committee on the Global Financial System
 
The survey clearly shows that emerging markets were also open to targeting specific 
sectors. The most widely used instruments have been measures to limit credit supply 
to specific sectors that are seen as prone to excessive credit growth. These included 
limits calibrated to borrower risk characteristics (caps on loan-to-value ratios or debt–
income ratios) as well aggregate or sectoral credit growth ceilings and limits on 
 2010) on macroprudential 
frameworks in various countries found that, although  the  aims and objectives of 
macroprudential  policy were not tightly defined,  many countries had used various 
instruments keeping the broad systemic perspective in mind. The survey also found far 
more extensive use of macroprudential policies by policy makers in emerging market 
economies as opposed to their counterparts in more advanced nations. Such 
macroprudential frameworks have helped enhance financial system resilience.  ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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exposures by instruments. Many emerging economies had already instituted 
measures to address specific risks—loan-to-deposit limits, core funding ratios, reserve 
requirements for liquidity risk, and limits on open currency positions or on derivatives 
transactions for foreign exchange risk.  
The nature and sources of systemic risks are different in emerging market economies. 
The Asian economies have seen many systemic crises since the nineties and each 
crisis has  demonstrated the importance of prudential policy to minimize risks to 
financial stability and to reduce the impact from disturbances domestically and 
globally. Financial markets in emerging markets tend to be less well developed and 
resilient than such markets in advanced economies. This makes the system more 
vulnerable to even small disturbances and increases the criticality of macroprudential 
safeguards. It therefore becomes imperative for the systemic stability perspective to 
guide other realms of economic policy framework as well.  
In India, this perspective was writ large on most of the elements of the policy 
framework. The approach adopted in three separate areas—prudential regulation of 
institutions,  the  capital account management framework,  and management of 
sovereign borrowings—illustrates the instilled systemic perspective in the policy 
sphere. 
   
(i)  Regulatory framework for banks 
The following specific examples indicate the systemic focus of prudential policies 
prescribed for banks: 
(a) Addressing interconnectedness 
  In regard to wholesale funding markets, prudential limits are in 
place on aggregate interbank liabilities for banks as a proportion 
of their net worth.  
  The overnight un-collateralized funding market is restricted only 
to banks and primary dealers, and there are ceilings for both 
lending as well as borrowing by these entities.  
  Investment by banks in subordinated debt of other banks is 
assigned 100% risk weight for capital adequacy purpose. In 
addition, the bank’s aggregate investment in Tier II bonds issued 
by other banks and financial institutions is limited to 10% of the 
investing bank’s total capital.  
  Exposure limits apply to exposures between banks and nonbank 
finance companies.  
(b) Foreign Exchange  liabilities: There are limits on the proportion of 
wholesale foreign currency liabilities intermediated through the banking 
system, other than for lending for exports. Retail foreign currency 
deposits from nonresidents are subject to minimum maturity 
requirements and interest rate caps.  
(c) Banks are required to hold a minimum of 24% of their liabilities in the 
form of liquid domestic sovereign securities. This stipulation has worked 
both as a solvency as well as a liquidity buffer.  ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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(d) The credit conversion factors used for calculating the potential future 
credit exposure for off-balance sheet interest rate as well as exchange 
rate contracts were doubled across all maturities in 2008. This was 
done since it was felt that the credit conversion factors according to the 
Basel norms did not fully capture the volatility in the interest rate and 
foreign exchange markets in India.   
(e) Profits on the sale of assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) under 
securitization are not allowed to be recognized immediately on the sale 
but over the life of the pass-through certificates issued by the special 
purpose vehicle (SPV). Any rated liquidity facility by the originator or a 
third party is to be treated as an off-balance sheet item and attracts a 
100% credit conversion factor. The risk weights to be applied to such 
exposures depend on the rating.  
 
(ii) Capital account management 
Excessive volatility of capital flows imposes significant costs to the economy beyond 
the obvious exchange rate impact. There are implications for financial stability in the 
form of induced risks of asset price bubbles and excessive foreign currency exposures 
in the financial system and external debt in general. Experience shows that the most 
volatile components of capital flows have been portfolio flows. These flows as well as 
debt flows are also pro-cyclical.  
While the capital account regime in India has accorded substantially large freedom to 
equity flows—both foreign direct investment as well as portfolio flows—debt flows have 
been attempted to be modulated contextually through a regulatory framework with a 
combination of quantitative and price-based measures. Calibration of the debt flows 
into sovereign as well as corporate debt has been the most actively used instrument 
for this purpose.      
  
(iii)   Management of sovereign borrowings 
Since the end of automatic monetization of government  debt in the 1990s, market 
borrowing by the government  has been a critical variable in the macroeconomic 
framework. The stipulation of a statutory liquidity ratio for banks needs to be seen in 
this context. Banks have been permitted to hold this mandated investment as “held to 
maturity.” 
Another critical factor that buffered the sovereign balance sheet from the vicissitudes 
of the global crisis is that India does not have foreign currency market borrowing and 
only a limited dependence on foreign investors in respect of domestic currency debt. A 
strong domestic investor base, apart from banks, in the form of insurance companies, 
pension funds and provident funds, has enabled India to elongate the maturity of its 
domestic debt. The experience in general of emerging market countries has been that 
foreign investors in sovereign debt prefer short-term investments.    
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4.  SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS  
The universally accepted post-crisis approach with regard to management of systemic 
risks in the financial system accords primacy to addressing the issue of “too big to fail.” 
The view is that resolution of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), short 
of a public-funded bailout, is at the heart of the too big to fail issue. SIFIs exaggerate 
the negative externalities and correlated exposures within the financial system. Their 
scale, complexity,  and interconnectedness imply  that their resolvability becomes 
extremely difficult—hence, the too big to fail conundrum.  
In November 2010, the Financial Stability Board set out a framework for addressing 
the moral hazard risks associated with SIFIs (Financial Stability Board 2010). Favoring 
a calibrated approach, the focus initially would be on global SIFIs, i.e., institutions of 
such size, market importance, and global interconnectedness that their distress or 
failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial system and adverse 
economic consequences across a range of countries. The recommendations are given 
in Box 2.  
 
 Box 2: Financial Stability Board Recommendations on  
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
 
The policy framework for SIFIs should combine  
 
(i) a resolution framework and other measures to ensure that all financial institutions 
can be resolved safely, quickly, and without destabilizing the financial system and exposing the 
taxpayer to the risk of loss;  
(ii) a requirement that SIFIs, initially in particular global SIFIs, have higher loss 
absorbency capacity to reflect the greater risks that these institutions pose to the global 
financial system;  
(iii) more intensive supervisory oversight for financial institutions that may pose a 
systemic risk;  
(iv) robust core financial market infrastructures to reduce the contagion risk from the 
failure of individual institutions; and  
(v) other supplementary prudential and other requirements as determined by national 
authorities.  
 
Additionally, home jurisdictions for global SIFIs should  
 
(i) enable a rigorous coordinated assessment of the risks facing the global SIFIs 
through international supervisory colleges;  
(ii) make international recovery and resolution planning mandatory for global SIFIs and 
negotiate institution-specific crisis cooperation agreements within cross-border crisis 
management groups; and 





Notes: SIFI: Systemically Important Financial Institutions  
* The Financial Stability Board, in its report on “Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important 
financial institutions” recommends establishment of a Peer Review Council (PRC), comprising senior 
members of the relevant national authorities having global-SIFIs operating as home or host in their 
jurisdictions, with a mandate to assess and report to the FSB the efficacy of national global-SIFI policies. 
Source(s): Financial Stability Board 
The real challenge will be to have a nondiscretionary framework for quantitatively 
defining the SIFIs. In November 2009, G20 finance ministers agreed on the criteria for 
identifying institutions and markets of systemic importance (G20 2009),
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joint proposals of the International Monetary Fund, the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board. Three main criteria are proposed: 
 
(i)  Size—measuring the volume of financial services provided by an 
institution or group. For the purpose of systemic risk identification, size 
is an exhaustive notion covering the exposures, or balance sheet and 
off-balance sheet risks, of the entity in question.  
 
(ii)  Lack of substitutability—assessing the financial system’s relative 
dependence on the financial services provided by a single entity to 
measure the system’s immunity to the disappearance of said entity.  
 
(iii)  Interconnectedness—looking at the direct and indirect links between 
financial institutions that will contribute to the spread of systemic risk 
and its contagion to the real economy.  
 
The Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have 
since started work on developing a broad methodology for identification of global 
SIFIs. Based on the assessment of quantitative criteria, national supervisors will be 
required to apply their judgment informed by ancillary indicators and other supervisory 
knowledge. The moral hazard associated with disclosing the names of SIFIs has been 
a critical issue. However, markets can usually identify banks that are considered SIFIs 
from the level of capital,  buffers,  and other aspects—without their names being 
disclosed. However, if banks operate well above the minimum requirement of capital 
and buffers, it may be harder for markets to identify SIFIs. Clear communication of 
policies to markets is important so that they understand the purpose and intent behind 
the identification of SIFIs and the regulatory approach in dealing with them. 
Work is also under  way  at the  Financial  Stability Board  in regard to improving 
authorities’ ability to resolve SIFIs in an orderly manner, without exposing taxpayers to 
loss, while maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions. In particular, the 
focus is on prescription of higher loss absorbency capacity for global SIFIs than the 
minimum levels agreed in Basel III, subjecting them to more intensive coordinated 
supervision and resolution planning to reduce the probability and impact of their 
failure.  
Improved resolution regime. The objective should be for all financial institutions to 
be resolvable in an orderly manner,  without taxpayers’ solvency support,  under 
applicable resolution regimes in the jurisdictions in which they operate. Various 
approaches that have gained traction in policy deliberations for improving resolution 
capacity include limits to the complexity of internal structures—a preference for stand-
alone subsidiaries, recovery and resolution planning, the use of contingent capital and 
other instruments to absorb losses as a going concern, a special resolution regime for 
SIFIs that makes shareholders and creditors share losses, and a bailout fund financed 
by the same entities expected to be bailed out. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act envisages a resolution regime that allows the 
government to impose losses on shareholders and creditors, unlike the normal 
bankruptcy provisions for other firms where the aim is to reorganize or liquidate a 
failing firm for the benefit of creditors. 
Strengthening supervision.  The effectiveness and intensity of the  supervisory 
process is critical. There is clearly a link between the depth and magnitude of the 
crisis, and the weakness of oversight of the financial system. Stressed environments 
often reveal weaknesses in the  supervisory framework and methods that were not 
apparent in times of stability. Regulators and supervisors should be better equipped ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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not just to identify but also take appropriate action preemptively to address risks that 
have the potential to destabilize the system. In this context,  the critical factor of 
supervisory space becomes significant. It is possible that at times supervisors may just 
have to rely on potential leads and do not have conclusive evidence.  In such a 
scenario, the supervisors would be prone to making either a Type I error or a Type II 
error in their judgment. The accountability mandates for the supervisors will need to 
clearly spell out the tolerance level  for each of the two errors. This would largely 
determine the decision-making framework and provide the necessary space for the 
regulators to take timely decisions, given that dynamic judgment is necessary to deal 
with system risk that is constantly changing.  
Strengthening markets and market infrastructure. One of the key areas of attention 
in this regard has been to move much of the over the counter (OTC)  derivatives 
market to a central clearing model. There is broad agreement in this regard, although 
a few important related issues arising out of risk concentration in central counterparties 
(CCP) will need to be addressed carefully, including cross margining across CCPs or 
across different products.  
There is also the issue of implicit or explicit liquidity support by the banking system to 
the CCPs in the form of lines of credit, or to intermediaries such as brokers and market 
participants in the form of margins for trades, payment commitments, or other forms of 
guarantees. It is likely that the risks of transactions undertaken through CCPs reside in 
banks’ and/or other regulated financial entities’ books directly or indirectly. In such a 
scenario, it needs to be ensured that CCPs are subject to all the prudential norms and 
that  risks are captured appropriately. Ideally, regulators of CCPs should prefer 
collateral in the form of liquid securities rather than bank deposits or guarantees.  
Besides CCPs, equally important issues relating to market practices affect financial 
stability.  A  fundamental issue is the undisputable faith in the benefits of ever-
increasing volumes and liquidity in all markets. Shifting to CCPs is only relocating the 
risks. There is need to regulate all derivatives markets in interest rate, credit,  and 
foreign exchange  products from a systemic perspective—the concept of market 
regulation practiced by many emerging countries may not be anachronistic.  
The regime for credit rating agencies is another critical area. In spite of the systemic 
risk inherent to ratings, current efforts to regulate rating agencies focus on 
microprudential issues and typically aim at reducing conflicts of interest and cliff effects 
by lowering use of credit ratings in the regulatory and supervisory framework. A moral 
hazard created by rating agencies is the use of support ratings wherein implicit 
sovereign support available to systemically important institutions is taken into account 
to upgrade ratings. It may be necessary to require agencies to provide ratings without 
an assumption of support. Addressing financial stability issues relating to potential pro-
cyclicality and systemic risk stemming from rating agencies is an agenda for future 
work. 
The other important issue, which will be accentuated by the move toward CCPs and 
collateral  support arrangements, is the increasing collateralization of bank balance 
sheets. Leverage is one part of this aspect—a recent International Monetary Fund 
paper  (Singh and Aitken 2010)  highlights  the risks inherent in widespread re-
hypothecation of collateral in many developed markets. The other part is the impact on 
bank balance sheets of pro-cyclical collateralization regimes. If a large part of the good 
quality collateral on banks’ books is locked up for their trading operations, what does it 
do to the resolvability issues in times of crisis and burden sharing? Both regulation of 
markets and close monitoring of interconnected exposures would be required to 
address the underlying risks.  
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Existing framework in India for monitoring large financial conglomerates 
The financial system in India is largely bank-dominated and banks are the parents of 
most of the large financial conglomerates
1
Current practices being followed in supervision of these conglomerates include off-site 
surveillance through quarterly returns, regular interactions with the CEOs of the arent 
companies  and other entities in the group,  and  periodic reviews by a technical 
committee including members from sectoral financial market regulators.  
. Since 2004, a framework has been in place 
to monitor certain large financial conglomerates closely,  aimed at reducing the 
probability of failure of these institutions considered to be systemically important in 
view of concerns relating to the moral hazard associated with the too-big-to-fail 
proposition,  and the contagion or reputation effects on account of  the holding-out 
phenomenon.  
The two-pronged structured processes in the nature of off-site surveillance and the 
periodic interface with the conglomerates has proved quite robust in assessing the 
risks faced by these conglomerates.  These  conglomerates  have been advised to 
improve their corporate governance processes and risk management systems—
especially with respect to the management of credit concentration risks and liquidity 
risks on a group-wide basis. 
Recently,  other initiatives have been launched to  strengthen the regulatory  and 
supervisory approaches for the identified conglomerates. Discussion with the main 
auditor of the group by the lead regulator is being contemplated. The Reserve Bank of 
India is taking steps to tighten the capital adequacy norms for these conglomerates to 
ensure that the amount of capital that the group possesses on a consolidated basis is 
adequate not only from the discretionary risks that the group entities take but also 
sufficient from nondiscretionary risks such as operational, reputational, and strategic 
risks—especially from fiduciary activities.  
Perspectives on the Indian Approach 
The above approach to large financial conglomerates is focused on an  intensive 
supervisory process aimed at capturing risk concentrations within the group. 
A differential prudential framework for systemically large institutions has not been 
considered necessary,  as the regulatory framework for banks generally  tries to 
address  issues of excessive risk-taking by individual institutions. India’s  financial 
system is considerably less complex than that of most developed markets, as many 
complex, high-risk products are not allowed or are regulated.  
The sole metric of size has not been found to be very helpful in identifying systemically 
important institutions. Apart from the largest bank, which is state-owned, and a large 
private sector bank that has a relatively low market share, the market share of the 
other large banks is not very significant. Relative to the needs of the growing economy 
and the rapid growth in nonfinancial conglomerates, emerging countries will require a 
larger number of banks with optimal size to meet increasing demand. The focus has 
therefore been on differential and intensive supervision of large banks that are 
conglomerates (which includes the size metric).      
The real concern from the interconnectedness perspective arises from the nonbanking 
financial sector. Broadly the sector comes under the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Reserve Bank of India, though certain key segments viz. insurance, securities broking, 
mutual funds, venture capital, and  housing finance  have been exempt from RBI 
regulation as there are other regulators for these segments.  
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Many of the nonbank financial institutions  that  do not accept public deposits are 
significantly large and could pose a systemic risk through their interaction with other 
financial market segments. For such entities, a stricter prudential framework on the 
lines of banks has been put in place.  
Going forward, stronger SIFI policies will have to be considered, drawing on a range of 
policy levers.                       
5.  CONCLUSION 
Macroprudential regulation is an inexact science. It has its limitations and needs to be 
used in conjunction with other policies to be effective. For leaning against the buildup 
of imbalances, a combination of monetary and macroprudential policies is required. If 
inflation risks are emerging, macroprudential  measures cannot take the place of 
interest rate increases. Macroprudential measures are well suited to enhancing the 
resilience of the financial system,  but their effect on aggregate demand and 
inflationary expectations is weak compared with interest rates. It is also important to 
acknowledge what macroprudential regulation cannot do—it cannot manage economic 
cycles or target asset prices. It can only provide instruments to respond to these 
developments to cushion the financial system from potential stresses. In this context, 
the imperative for the involvement of central banks becomes evident. Otherwise, the 
required synergy between monetary management and macroprudential management 
will be lost.  
The real challenge of macroprudential regulation is strong resistance to countercyclical 
actions during booms. Having a rule-based approach will largely obviate this problem, 
but this approach has its limitations. It is difficult to lay down simple rules as the 
financial system and markets are evolving and banks continue to be the  dominant 
source of funding. Suitability of tools can change as the structure of the economy and 
financial system changes, but  regulators may have to rely on continued use of 
discretionary adjustments. 
As the global policy stance remains highly accommodative, there are concerns that the 
current two-speed recovery will imply short-term volatile capital flows or accentuation 
of carry trades, which increase foreign currency mismatches of the nonfinancial sector. 
Emerging market economies will have to address these issues with a range of policy 
tools. A realistic assessment may be required about what capital regulations can do. 
Banks need capital for lending and to be resilient against shocks.  
Going beyond macroprudential regulation, an issue that will be of critical importance to 
the  emerging market economies from a stability perspective is the nature of the 
presence of foreign financial institutions. This would determine the exposure of the 
domestic financial systems to the risk of proxy contamination with problems in global 
markets. A recent Bank for International Settlements paper (McCauley, McGuire, and 
von Peter 2010)  attempts to make a distinction between multinational banks and 
international banks, primarily based on their funding models. It argues that, from the 
perspective of the stability of banks’ exposure to borrowers, locally funded positions 
(as in the case of multinational banks) are more stable during crises than those funded 
across borders and currencies (as in the case of international banks). For the host 
country, the key relevant issue from a market disruption perspective is the 
destabilizing spillover on local lending decisions as a result of problems in the global 
wholesale funding and swap markets. This materialized for many borrowing countries 
during the recent crisis.  
In India, the banking sector is at a crucial regime-shift point and the way ahead is 
significantly contingent on the evolving thinking in regard to SIFIs. Policy deliberations ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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are weighing the various options in respect of two areas: one, increasing competition 
and furthering financial inclusion by licensing new banks domestically and two, giving 
further space for foreign banks to expand their operations. Increasing competition can 
help in reducing the extent of systemic significance of the existing institutions, provided 
it is accompanied by other requisite measures to strengthen the legal and institutional 
framework. ADBI Working Paper 286                                                                                                 Gopinath 
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